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FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
by
Ellen K. Solender*
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
URING the 1987-88 Term the United States Supreme Court de-
cided three cases that affect the law of parent and child. In Thomp-
son v. Thompson I the Court held that the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA)2 does not create a private cause of action in federal
court. The Court, in the absence of specific statutory language, found noth-
ing in the legislative history of the PKPA to support the inference that Con-
gress intended a private right of action. 3 The Court found that Congress
intended to extend the requirements of the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution4 to child custody decrees 5 and that the "PKPA is
a mandate directed to state courts to respect the custody decrees of sister
States."'6 The Court reasoned that since Congress did not intend that the
federal courts play an enforcement role in child custody decisions, it also did
not intend that the federal courts become entangled in situations where two
state courts have issued conflicting custody orders based on conflicting juris-
dictional determinations. 7
The result of the Thompson decision is that interpretation of the PKPA
will remain in the hands of the state courts and that conflicts such as the one
giving rise to Thompson will remain unresolved. Ultimately, the United
States Supreme Court will have to resolve the "truly intractable jurisdic-
tional deadlocks,"8 but will not have a neutral, thoughtful body of law on
which to rely. The PKPA is not clearly written. As such, a number of more
neutral lower federal court decisions would aid the Court in the interpreta-
tion process.
Hicks v. Feiock 9 concerned the problem of using a contempt order to im-
prison a delinquent obligor as a means of enforcing child support obliga-
tions. An obligor's failure to pay court ordered support is usually due either
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
1. 108 S. Ct. 513, 98 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1988).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
3. 108 S. Ct. at 516, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 520.
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5. 108 S. Ct. at 517-18, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 521-22.
6. Id. at 518, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 522.
7. Id. at 519-20, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 524.
8. Id. at 520, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 525.
9. 108 S. Ct. 1423, 98 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1988).
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to poverty or lack of motivation. In the case of a lack of motivation, the
threat of imprisonment may provide the incentive to pay. When, however,
the obligor is actually impoverished and cannot pay, imprisonment becomes
punishment for poverty. Distinguishing between the two reasons for failure
to pay is quite difficult, and often only the obligor knows the reason. In
Hicks Feiock failed to pay child support as required by a valid court order.
Feiock argued that requiring him to show that he could not pay, so as to
avoid contempt, was an unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof.
The California appellate court, interpreting California law, agreed that this
was criminal contempt; therefore, incarceration on these facts was unconsti-
tutional.' 0 The California Supreme Court denied review.1 '
The United States Supreme Court, confronted with a rather confused situ-
ation, held that it could not reinterpret state law. 12 The Court instead dis-
tinguished between criminal and civil contempt by stating that civil
contempt is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant, while criminal
contempt is punitive and for the purpose of vindicating the authority of the
court. 13 The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
contempt in this case was civil or criminal.
Hicks is important in that it permits obligees to continue to ask for coer-
cive orders when the obligor has failed to pay court-ordered support, while
at the same time protecting the obligor from punitive imprisonment. The
courts must make clear that the purpose of the contempt order is to benefit
the obligee. To avoid unnecessary imprisonment, the obligor must either
pay what is owed to the obligee or demonstrate that payment is impossible.
Hicks does not change Texas law and practice, as had been feared; it merely
requires that the attorneys and judges be clear in their complaints and
orders.
Clark v. Jeter 14 is the third in a series of cases extending the statute of
limitations for paternity actions.15 The Court in Clark, while finding a six-
year statute of limitations unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, did
not specify that six years was too short a time. 16 The Court merely held that
the six-year limitation did not relate substantially to Pennsylvania's interest
in avoiding stale or fraudulent claims. 17 One interpretation of this decision
would allow a statute of limitations of less than six years for paternity ac-
tions. Alternatively, the case may suggest that as a result of scientific ad-
vances, an indefinite statute of limitations is required. The only certain
10. In re Feiock, 180 Cal. App. 3d 649, 653-56, 225 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750-51 (1986).
11. Id. at 648, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
12. Hicks, 108 S. Ct. at 1428, 99 L. Ed. 2d at 730.
13. Id. at 1429, 99 L. Ed. 2d at 731 (quoting Gompers v. Buck's Store & Range Co., 22
U.S. 418, 441 (1911)).
14. 108 S. Ct. 1910, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1988).
15. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (Court held one-year statute of limitations a
denial of equal protection); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (Court held two-year statute of
limitations a denial of equal protection).
16. 108 S. Ct. at 1913-14, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 471.
17. Id. at 1915, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 473.
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holding is that an argument based on avoiding stale or fraudulent litigation
in paternity cases is not convincing.
II. STATUS
Grandparents and other persons who have minor children living with
them often find it necessary to enroll the children in the local public school,
although the custodians are not the children's legal guardians. Strict laws
govern the residency requirements for enrollment for free public education
in Texas. i8 Texas school districts are concerned that children seeking to
enroll in their schools are bona fide residents of the district and are not in the
district for the primary purpose of attending a particular school. In Byrd v.
Livingston Independent School District 19 the court found that the children in
question were undisputedly living in the district for reasons other than
school attendance. The court analyzed the statute and found that the statu-
tory test is in the disjunctive; it is not necessary that a child both reside with
a legal guardian and be a bona fide resident in order to attend the local
public school. 20 The court held that based on the particular facts the Living-
ston school district's interpretation of the statute violated the children's con-
stitutional rights.2'
In Del A. v. Edwards22 fifteen Louisiana foster children filed suit for dam-
ages, 2 3 alleging that the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices had violated the Child Welfare Act of 1980.24 The defendants moved
for dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity. The court held that when
officials violate understandable provisions of the Child Welfare Act they are
not entitled to a qualified immunity and affirmed the district court's ruling in
favor of the plaintiff children.2 5 This ruling
is of interest to Texas attorneys since it is from the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and, therefore, applies to Texas as well as Louisiana.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Carr2 6 the parties asked a federal
court to decide if a biological father was entitled to proceeds of a group life
insurance policy that designated no beneficiary. Because the decedent was a
federal employee, the government had issued the policy pursuant to federal
law. 27 Since the decedent died intestate, unmarried, and childless, the pay-
ment was to be made in accordance with federal law. The applicable provi-
18. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 23.01 (Vernon 1972).
19. 674 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
20. Id. at 228.
21. Id. at 228-29. The court based its decision on both the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, and Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321
(1983).
22. 855 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1988).
23. The suit was for damages for the particular plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
The suit also asked for class-wide injunctive relief. 855 F.2d at 1150.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
25. 855 F.2d at 1153-54.
26. 690 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
27. Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
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sion of the policy provided for payment "to the parents of the employee."'2 8
The mother and the biological father of the deceased had neither married
nor attempted to marry. The mother contended that she was entitled to the
entire proceeds of the policy because she was the only parent as defined by
Texas law. The biological father claimed that the Texas Family Code did
not apply to insurance policies of adults. The court held that Texas law
controlled the interpretation of the term "parent" as used by federal law in
this situation.2 9 The court then looked at the applicable Texas Family Code
provisions 30 and held that because the biological father had neither adopted
his son nor established his paternity prior to the death of his son, he was not
a "parent" under Texas law.31
In a wrongful death case, Garza v. Maverick Market, Inc.,32 the Corpus
Christi court of appeals sustained the directed verdict granted by the trial
court in favor of the defendant. 33 The court held that the mother of an
illegitimate child born after the death of the alleged biological father had no
standing to bring the suit as the next friend of the minor child. 34 The court
found that the decedent had not recognized the child prior to the decedent's
death. 3 5 To qualify as a recognized child of the decedent under the Wrong-
ful Death Act,36 the child's biological father must have taken some action
with regard to the child under either the Family Code37 or the Probate
Code. 38 Since the child's alleged father had been killed before the birth of
the child, such action was not possible. The child's mother and grand-
mother testified that the child was in fact the child of the decedent, but the
court did not find this evidence probative. 39 Nevertheless, in Brown v. Ed-
wards Transfer Co. 40 the Texas Supreme Court in a plurality opinion held
that illegitimate children may recover under the Wrongful Death Act if they
can establish their paternity by clear and convincing evidence. 41 The court
did not use the definition of child in effect in the Probate Code at the time of
death;42 instead the court relied on the legislature's intent not to punish ille-
gitimate children for circumstances beyond their control.43 Brown involved
adult illegitimate children, and the jury had found that the decedent was the
biological father of the children. Since the court has granted a writ of error
in the Garza case, it may reverse the holding in the case on the issue of the
28. Id. § 8705(a).
29. 690 F. Supp. at 571.
30. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(3), 12.02 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
31. 690 F. Supp. at 573.
32. 744 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ granted).
33. 744 S.W.2d at 289-90.
34. 744 S.W.2d at 289.
35. Id. at 288.
36. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 1986).
37. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.21-.22 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
38. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1989).
39. 744 S.W.2d at 289.
40. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 108 (Dec. 10, 1988).
41. Id. at 109.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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mother's standing and remand to permit the introduction of evidence that
can meet the clear and convincing standard established in Brown.
The appellate courts reversed and remanded two paternity cases because
the trial court had not followed the proper procedures. In re S.P.H.45 the
trial court erred in permitting an expert witness who had not been presented
at the pretrial hearing to testify. This action by the trial court violated the
statute, since no good cause was shown for his earlier failure to appear.46 In
De LaRosa v. Garza,47 despite the fact that upon the joint motion of the
parties a court dismissed with prejudice a prior proceeding, the trial court
heard the refiled paternity action and found the appellant to be the biological
father. 48 The appellate court found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case because of the prior dismissal, but because the Family Code49
allows persons other than the mother to bring paternity actions, the court
remanded the case in the interests of justice.50
The Texas Supreme Court in In re S.C. V 51 reversed a paternity decision
that was based on the presumption that a child born during the marriage is
the child of the husband. The alleged father, the husband, the mother, and
the child had all submitted to blood tests. The results excluded the husband
from the group of potential fathers, but included the alleged father. The jury
found that the alleged father was the father of the child even though the
court had excluded the blood test results of the husband. 52 The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's findings on the issue of paternity.5 3 The court
noted that its decision in Davis v. Davis54 rejected Lord Mansfield's rule and
replaced it with a rule that would allow evidence bearing directly on the
truth being determined. 55 The court held that blood grouping tests are gen-
erally the best evidence for establishing nonpaternity and that courts should
give the tests probative weight.56
The court used the doctrine of res judicata rather than blood tests to de-
cide paternity in Espree v. Guillory.5 7 Espree involved a paternity suit that
had been severed from and followed a divorce action. The trial judge found
that a parent-child relationship existed between the alleged father, a third
party, and the child, and ordered visitation privileges.58 Unfortunately for
44. The court appears willing to accept evidence that bears directly on the truth being
determined. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
45. 739 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
46. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.06(a) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989) (allowing trial
testimony only by witnesses who testified at the pretrial conference, absent a showing of good
cause).
47. 748 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
48. Id. at 25.
49. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
50. 748 S.W.2d at 26.
51. 750 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. 1988).
52. Id. at 763.
53. Id. at 766.
54. 521 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. 1975).
55. Id. at 607-08.
56. 750 S.W.2d at 764-65.
57. 753 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
58. Id. at 723.
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the third party, the husband and wife had entered into a consent decree that
found the child, born during the marriage, to be legitimate. The husband
appealed the trial court's finding, and the appellate court held that the third
party had no independent right to contest the child's legitimacy and that the
consent decree was dispositive of the issue. 59 The dissenting judge claimed
that the third party had standing to pursue his claim and that the language
of the consent decree did not determine the biological father. 60
In TE.D. v. Emerson 61 the court conditionally granted a writ of manda-
mus. 62 The husband filed a petition for divorce, and his wife cross-peti-
tioned, claiming that the husband was not the father of the child that was
born during the marriage. The alleged father, the mother, and the child all
submitted to blood tests, and the alleged father intervened in the divorce
action, claiming to be the biological father. The mother then asked the trial
judge to order her husband to submit to blood tests. The judge, believing he
did not have authority to make such an order, denied the request.63 The
court of appeals examined the Family Code provision that permits a hus-
band or wife to contest paternity 64 and concluded that it includes the right of
either spouse to obtain a blood test from the other spouse.65
In Jilani v. Jilani66 the Texas Supreme Court allowed an action by a mi-
nor against his father for injuries caused by the negligent operation of an
automobile. The child was injured when his father lost control of the car in
a one-car accident. The court, relying on Felderhoff v. Felderhoff67 found
the type of negligence involved in this case to be outside the sphere of paren-




It is elementary law that in order for a court to have power to decide
issues, it must first have jurisdiction. In deciding conservatorship questions
the court must have jurisdiction over all the parties.69 The purpose of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)70 is to provide guidelines
for proper exercise of jurisdiction in child custody cases. In Swink v.
Swink 71 the trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction and, therefore,
could not make a determination as to managing conservatorship. Although
59. Id. at 724.
60. Id. at 726.
61. 746 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.06 (Vernon 1986).
65. 746 S.W.2d at 313.
66. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 123 (Dec. 17, 1988).
67. 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971) (retaining the rule of parental immunity in cases of
ordinary negligence while discharging basic parental duties).
68. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 124.
69. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53 (Vernon 1986).
70. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-.75 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
71. 745 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
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the child was born in Texas, the parties had lived in Arizona for approxi-
mately eight months just prior to their separation. The husband moved to
Texas, taking the child with him. A month later he filed for divorce and
conservatorship in Texas. At approximately the same time, the wife filed
similar suits in Arizona. The appellate court found that the trial court had
correctly applied the pertinent provisions of the UCCJA 72 and affirmed. 73
While jurisdiction is essential, the grounds for deciding custody are also
important. In Hodorowski v. Ray74 the Fifth Circuit held that child care
workers have only a qualified immunity in child abuse cases. 7 5 The court
found that the workers in this case had acted reasonably and violated no
clearly established right. 76 The workers had removed the children from
their home without a warrant because they feared further injury to the chil-
dren. The children had bruises, which while not life-threatening were se-
vere, and a report stated that the father had chased the children with a
chain.
In Leigh v. Parker77 the mother sued her psychologist for revealing confi-
dential matters without her consent during a custody hearing. She relied on
a now repealed statute78 that created a privilege of confidentiality between
psychologists and their patients. The mother alleged that she had lost cus-
tody of her child because of Parker's testimony. Parker responded that he
had testified only after the judge had ruled that he should testify; therefore
he was privileged and protected from any liability. The appellate court
agreed and affirmed the trial court's take nothing judgment. 79
In Wriston v. Kosel 80 the court found that the rule stating that the custody
of two or more children should not be divided absent compelling reasons did
not apply to half-siblings. 8' The court found that in such cases the best
interest of the child whose custody is at issue82 is the only important or
necessary factor. 83
Although the Family Code does not specifically address the duty to pro-
72. A Texas court has jurisdiction over a custody dispute if Texas is the child's home state
or if no other state has jurisdiction. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53(a)(1), (2) (Vernon 1986);
home state is defined as the state in which the child has lived with his parents for at least six
months immediately preceeding the filing of suit. Id. § 11.52(5).
73. 745 S.W.2d at 465-66.
74. 844 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1988).
75. Id. at 1216. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text for discussion of court's
determination in Del A. v. Edwards that officials had destroyed their qualified immunity.
76. Id. at 1217.
77. 740 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied).
78. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5561(h) (Vernon 1958).
79. 740 S.W.2d at 104.
80. 742 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, writ denied).
81. Id. at 870.
82. "The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court
in determining questions of managing conservatorship ..... TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.07(a) (Vernon 1986).
83. 742 S.W.2d at 870. In Pizzitola v. Pizzitola, 748 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), the court specifically relied on this same reasoning.
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vide medical treatment for a child in the managing conservator's custody,84
the court in Chapa v. Texas8 5 implied such a duty. The court found that any
managing conservator, not only the child's parent, is responsible for provid-
ing medical treatment.86 In this case the managing conservator was an aunt
of the child. The child had died as a result of abuse by a third party, com-
bined with the failure of the aunt to obtain medical treatment for the child.
Based on these factors the trial court convicted the aunt of injury to the
child.87
A court must have jurisdiction of the matter and the parties to modify a
prior custody decision, as well to establish custody.88 In a habeas corpus
case, Hanson v. Leckey,8 9 the court held that the PKPA90 does not require
that a Texas court recognize the Kansas court's decree. 91 Under Texas law,
however, the court should do so if possible. 92 The court examined both the
Texas and Kansas version of the UCCJA and found the purposes of the two
in substantial agreement. 93 The court then held that under the Texas stat-
ute,94 and based on the facts of this case, it was required to enforce the
Kansas order.95 This reading of both the Texas statute and the PKPA is
probably too broad, since the PKPA is a federal statute and the states are
expected to follow it.96 In this particular case, however, no problem arose
since the Texas court deferred to the Kansas court, so that only one state
had jurisdiction.
When a court acquires jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child rela-
tionship, that court's jurisdiction continues until the child in question is no
longer a minor or the court is legally required to transfer jurisdiction. 97 In
Lewis v. McCoy98 the managing conservator, the mother, died, and the fa-
ther automatically became entitled to possession of the child.99 The grand-
parents, to prevent the father from taking possession, attempted to become
managing conservators by filing motions in their home county, rather than
in the county where the original decree had been rendered. The parties filed
many motions in the two counties. Ultimately the father prevailed by means
of a writ of mandamus. The appellate court held that the original court had
84. For a statement of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a managing conserva-
tor, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.02 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
85. 747 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, pet. ref'd).
86. Id. at 563.
87. Id. at 561. The court relied on TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon 1974),
which defines as a crime conduct that results in serious physical or mental harm to a child.
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.53, 11.64 (Vernon 1986).
89. 754 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); see supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
91. 754 S.W.2d at 294.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 294-95.
94. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.63 (Vernon 1986).
95. 754 S.W.2d at 296.
96. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
97. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon 1986).
98. 747 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
99. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04(1) (Vernon 1986).
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continuing jurisdiction.' ° ° The court reasoned that since the trial court's
jurisdiction was over the child, and after the death of the managing conser-
vator, a need for further orders and supervision may exist, jurisdiction would
still lie in the trial court.10 '
The same principle applies in a case where a mentally retarded child be-
comes eighteen, and the court has retained jurisdiction in order to provide
for support. 0 2 The original divorce court is the court of dominant jurisdic-
tion by virtue of having been the first to exercise jurisdiction. A probate
court, even though it has concurrent jurisdiction in such matters, should
defer to the divorce court. 10 3 If, however, during the pendency of a divorce,
one of the parties dies or is killed, the action abates and should be dis-
missed. 1° 4 Persons who wish to oust the surviving parent spouse from pos-
session of the child should file an independent action.10 5
After a modification based on the wife's signature prior to entry of the
order, the wife brought a writ of error in Kissinger v. Kissinger.'0 6 The court
granted the writ because the wife met the four requirements: (1) the suit was
brought within six months; (2) the suit was brought by a party; (3) the party
did not participate in the actual trial; and (4) some error was apparent on the
face of the record.' 0 7 Neither the wife nor her attorney had appeared at the
hearing, and no record had been made of the hearing as required by the
statute;' 0 8 therefore error existed on the face of the record.109
A motion to modify may be brought less than a year after the original
decree by the managing conservator, or by the possessory conservator if the
possessory conservator attaches an affidavit alleging the present environment
injures the child's health. 110 If the court believes the affidavit asserts enough
facts to support the requirement, it may schedule a hearing on the motion. I II
The court need not make separate findings concerning the affidavit., 12 The
court must simply hold the hearing and render its decision based on the facts
presented. 1 3 In Bolden v. Clapp 1'4 the court held that when a managing
conservator has voluntarily relinquished the care and possession of a child to
a relative for more than twelve months, mandamus will not issue to reverse
the temporary orders of the trial court changing the managing conservator-
100. 747 S.W.2d at 50.
101. Id.
102. Rowland v. Willy, 751 S.W.2d 725, 726-27 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988,
no writ).
103. Id. at 727.
104. Garcia v. Daggett, 742 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no
writ).
105. Id. at 809-10.
106. 748 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
107. Id. at 4.
108. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.14(d) (Vernon 1986).
109. 748 S.W.2d at 5.
110. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(d) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
111. Id. § 14.08(e).
112. In re J.K.B., 750 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
113. Id.
114. 751 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
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ship to the relative who has had possession of the child.11 5 The court rea-
soned that a showing of voluntary relinquishment in the section of the
Family Code concerning modification of conservatorship' 16 requires a
lighter standard of proof than a showing of abandonment in the section pro-
viding for termination of parental rights. 117 It found, therefore, that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in changing the managing conservator. 118
In Tropoli v. Markentonis1t 9 an appellate court also found no abuse by a
court that assessed attorney's fees following dismissal of a motion to modify
conservatorship. 120 The trial court based dismissal on want of prosecution.
The trial court then reinstated the case, found for the mother, and assessed
attorney's fees against the father as costs. The appellate court denied the
father's contention that assessment of fees is punitive, holding that under the
Family Code1 21 the assessment is based on the best interest rationale. 122
Wright v. Wentzel 123 is a Texas case that the mother attempted to make
an interstate case. In the original divorce decree the mother had been named
managing conservator. Some years later she left the child with the father,
who after several months filed a motion to modify, but did not serve the
mother. Having moved to New Hampshire, she returned to Texas, took the
child from her pre-school, and flew back to New Hampshire. The father
filed for a temporary restraining order and hired a private investigator who
found the child and her mother. At a New Hampshire police station the
mother was served the motion to modify, the temporary restraining order,
and notice of a show cause hearing to take place two days later. When she
failed to appear for the hearing, the trial court, concerned that two days'
notice was unrealistic, rescheduled the hearing. The father notified her of
the resetting by both certified and regular mail. The certified letter was re-
turned unclaimed, and the court then signed ex parte temporary orders.
The father went to New Hampshire and obtained possession of his daugh-
ter based on the orders. Some three months later the trial court heard the
merits of the motion to modify and appointed the father managing conserva-
tor. The mother did not appear, nor did she file an answer. The court ap-
pointed her possessory conservator contingent on the father's consent. She
then filed for a writ of error, claiming that she had received insufficient no-
tice and that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction. The appellate court
found that she was given notice and opportunity to be heard when she was
115. Id. at 677.
116. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(g)(2) (Vernon 1986) (restricting the issuance
of modification orders to situations where the conservator relinquished care, control, and pos-
session for more than twelve months and such order is in best interest of the child).
117. Bolden, 751 S.W.2d at 677; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1) (Vernon 1986) (re-
stricting the issuance of termination orders to a list of very serious acts or omissions by the
parent).
118. 751 S.W.2d at 677.
119. 740 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
120. Id. at 565.
121. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.18 (Vernon 1986).
122. 740 S.W.2d at 565.
123. 749 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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served at the police station in New Hampshire. 124 The appellate court also
ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction since all parties were living in
Texas when the father filed the motion to modify and, furthermore, Texas
was always the child's home state. 125 The court did find that while sufficient
evidence to support modification existed, the trial court erred in making visi-
tation contingent on the father's consent.12 6 The court pointed out that the
Family Code states that a court may not deny access to a parent unless there
is a showing that it would endanger the child. 127
In Scroggins v. Scroggins 128 a father countered a motion to enforce child
support orders with a motion to modify. He succeeded at the trial level, but
the appellate court reversed, holding that he had presented insufficient evi-
dence to show that retention of the present managing conservator would be
injurious to the child.129 Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered. Un-
fortunately the child support question seems to have been lost in the shuffle
since the appellate court did not mention it.
An appellate court denied a petition for habeas corpus when the petitioner
failed to file a statement of facts or brief with the petition. 130 A denial of a
writ of habeas corpus is not appealable. 131 Rather, the proper remedy is by
mandamus. 132  In MR.J. v. Vick 1 33 the court denied habeas corpus
although the father was able to demonstrate his entitlement to custody based
on a prior court order, but the court refused to issue mandamus because of
the peculiar facts of the case. 1 34 Vick involved a custody dispute between
the paternal grandmother, who had physical custody, and the father. The
trial court had not abused its discretion by holding an in camera interview
with the child when it became concerned about the child's welfare. 135
Where the trial court did err was in failing to make a written finding as to
the serious and immediate question of the welfare of the child.' 36 The appel-
late court ordered the trial court to enter orders consistent with the appellate
court's opinion. 1 37
IV. SUPPORT
Congress enacted the Family Support Act of 1988, 138 which modifies the
earlier Child Enforcement Amendments of 1984.139 One major change re-
124. Id. at 232.
125. Id. at 231-32.
126. Id. at 234.
127. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(d) (Vernon 1986).
128. 753 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
129. Id. at 832-33.
130. Ex parte Davis, 753 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
131. Nydegger v. Breig, 740 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
132. Id.
133. 753 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
134. Id. at 528-29.
135. Id. at 528.
136. Id. at 529.
137. Id.
138. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
139. Child Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1986).
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quires that after 1994 the states must provide for immediate wage withhold-
ing with respect to all new support orders. 14 Another section provides for a
commission to study this provision, so perhaps the provision will not become
effective. Since the commission is not required to report until late 1991,
Texas may have to amend its support statutes during the coming legislative
session. 14 1 The Determination of Paternity section 142 may require some
changes as well since the Act addresses establishment of paternity issues.
The common law governed a case that was tried and went to final judg-
ment during the period before the Texas Supreme Court had adopted final
support guidelines. 143 The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in
awarding $3500 a month for child support since the obligor was earning
approximately $220,000 per year. Indeed, the appellate court stated that
$3500 a month would be considered a conservative amount were it not for
the fact that the obligor was required to pay all medical expenses and keep
and maintain various insurance policies.' 44 The court held that the trial
court had abused its discretion by providing for increases of $1000 per
month starting in September 1987 and again in 1988.145 The court found
insufficient evidence to support these increases. 146
In Texas ex rel. Williams v. Green 147 a parent attempted to have the At-
torney General of Texas represent her in a motion to modify child support.
The trial court dismissed, finding no statutory authority for such representa-
tion. The appellate court agreed. The court interpreted the Human Re-
sources Code 148 very narrowly in holding that the power to represent a
private person in a suit to establish custody is not a power to represent a
private person in a suit to modify custody.149 A dissent took the contrary
position. 150
After a court has entered a default judgment on a motion to modify, the
defaulting party may obtain a new trial by showing that his failure to appear
was not the result of conscious indifference, that he has a meritorious de-
fense, and that the granting of the new trial will not harm the other party. 51
In Ritter v. Wiggins 152 the husband failed to meet this burden because he did
140. Title I: Child Support and Establishment of Paternity: Subtitle A-Child Support
Sec. 101 Immediate Income Withholding, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2001 (1988).
141. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.30-.51 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
142. Id. §§ 13.01-.09 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
143. Eikenhorst v. Eikenhorst, 746 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988,
no writ).
144. Id. at 886.
145. Id. at 886-87.
146. Id.
147. 746 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, writ denied).
148. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 76.007 (Vernon 1988). "Attorneys employed by the
attorney general may represent the state or other parties in a suit to establish a child support
obligation, collect child support, or determine paternity brought under the authority of federal
law or this chapter."
149. 746 S.W.2d at 942.
150. Id. at 943-45 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
151. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted).
152. 756 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
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not show a meritorious defense. He claimed no change in circumstance had
occurred since either a prior private agreement on child support or a prior
court order. The prior court order related to access and thus was irrelevant.
The court held that the Family Code does not empower courts to modify
agreements between the parties, so no meritorious defense existed.' 53 An
appellant will not prevail when no record is filed with the appeal and the
judgment is within the scope of the pleadings. 1 54
A motion to transfer, when combined with a motion to modify the parent-
child relationship, is mandatory and automatic if the petitioner meets the six
months residence requirement. 155 Even if the motion to transfer is made
without an underlying modification motion, the transfer is not void if based
on proper notice. 156 If a motion to modify child support is filed prior to the
child's eighteenth birthday, the court has jurisdiction even though the hear-
ing will occur after that birthday.' 57
In McLeod v. McLeod 1 58 the Dallas court of appeals held that a judicial
error cannot be corrected nunc pro tunc. 159 In a prior decision the same
appellate court had held that when the trial court did not issue an underly-
ing support order no arrearages can be owed and, therefore, an order to pay
arrearages must be deleted.1 60 Following this decision the mother asked the
trial judge to rephrase his order from one to pay arrearages to one ordering
the retroactive payment of increased child support. The appellate court held
that this change was not a correction to effectuate a judgment, but the cor-
rection of a judicial error, and as such was not permissible.' 6 ' The court
then reinstated the earlier court order as modified in the prior case. 16
2
In Ruffin v. Ruffin 163 an appellate court held that the trial court could
enforce back child support orders by ordering withholding from veterans'
disability benefits.164 The court relied on Rose v. Rose 165 for its decision.
166
Since the Supreme Court in Rose simply held that state contempt orders
directed at the obligor are not preempted by federal law, it will be interesting
to see how the Veterans Administration responds to the withholding or-
der. 16 7 A party may not appeal a court's denial of contempt.168 If a court
properly finds a petitioner in civil contempt and incarcerates him, he is not
153. Id. at 864. The court relied on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon 1989),
which deals only with modifications of court orders and decrees.
154. Saenz v. Saenz, 756 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
155. Sokolsky v. McFall, 750 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
156. Botello v. Salazar, 745 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no
writ).
157. McLendon v. Allen, 752 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
158. 752 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
159. Id. at 678 (citing Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. 1978)).
160. McLeod v. McLeod, 723 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
161. 752 S.W.2d at 678.
162. Id. at 679.
163. 753 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
164. Id.
165. 107 S. Ct. 2029, 95 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1987).
166. 753 S.W.2d at 826-28.
167. 107 S. Ct. at 2036-37, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 610-11.
168. Pruett v. Pruett, 754 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no writ).
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entitled to a good-conduct deduction from his court-ordered
commitment. 169
Courts will grant habeas corpus writs in child support contempt cases
when the contemnor has raised the issue of indigency and has not been ad-
vised of his right to appointed counsel.' 70  The Houston appeals court
granted the writ when the trial court did not clearly and unambiguously
inform the contemnor of what he needed to do to avoid contempt.' 7' A
contempt order must be supported by a record of the proceeding.' 72 If,
however, the order is based on an agreement by the parties, then no record is
necessary. '
73
In Ex parte Connor 174 the Beaumont court of appeals held that probation
was a sufficient restraint on liberty to permit filing a writ,17 5 but remanded to
the trial court to determine if a record had been made.' 76 The court then
granted a second petition for a writ based on the finding that no record ex-
isted and that any agreement that was made was between the attorneys and
not the parties.' 7 7 A vigorous dissent pointed out that the contemnor was
represented by competent counsel, had authorized counsel to sign the agree-
ment, and this court was simply delaying the payment of child support to
children in need. 178
Three cases concerning support for dependent children over
eighteen may provide the answer to the question of how one spouse can
obtain a support order for the other spouse. 1 79 In In re Marriage of Bur-
rell 'so the parties obtained a divorce after the dependent child had reached
eighteen. The child was in fact almost twenty-eight years old. The wife
asked for child support. The trial court entered an order, but the appellate
court reversed on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under
169. Ex parte Harrison, 741 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
170. See, e.g., Ex parte Berryhill, 750 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no
writ) (granting writ because contemnor was not advised of his right to compel after appellate
court had previously ordered trial court to allow contemnor to develop facts as to his indi-
gency), 741 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ); Ex parte Walker, 748
S.W.2d 21, 22 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ) (holding that because the indigent was not so
advised his rights were not waived); Ex parte Goodman, 742 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1987, no writ) (failure to advise father of his rights violated his fifth and sixth
amendment rights and voided the order).
171. Exparte Bagwell, 754 S.W.2d 490, 492-93 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no
writ) (voiding an ambiguous court order); Ex parte Sinclair, 746 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (voiding an order because of lack of clarity).
172. E.g., Ex parte Fain, 750 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
173. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.32(b) (Vernon 1986).
174. 746 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 528.
177. Ex parte Connor, 749 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
178. Id. at 242-46.
179. 747 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied); Adkins v. Adkins, 743
S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied); Runnells v. Firestone, 746 S.W.2d 845
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ denied per curiam, 760 S.W.2d 240 (1988).
180. 747 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied).
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the Family Code. 18 1 In Adkins v. Adkins 18 2 the court reached a different
result. 18 3 Initially the mother asked for support under the Family Code.
The court denied her request in an unreported opinion. The mother, as the
guardian of her incompetent adult son, then asked the trial court for a sup-
port order under the Probate Code. 184 The trial court denied the order on
the basis that the son had a small estate with some income and the mother
was employed and capable of supporting him. The appellate court found
first that the earlier judgment would not bar this action because the mother
was suing in a different capacity. 185 She was not appointed guardian until
after the divorce; therefore the doctrine of res judicata was not dispositive of
her rights. 18 6 Then the court, relying on Red v. Red 187 and its reference to
the Probate Code, 188 reversed and remanded. 189 The appellate court held
that the trial court should determine whether the father was capable of con-
tributing support and, if so, should order him to pay an amount commensu-
rate with his ability. 190
Finally, in Runnells v. Firestone 191 a mother sought the same type of relief
as the mothers in Burrell and Adkins although her case was considerably
more complicated. The divorce had been in Florida, the father had never
lived in Texas, had moved to Canada, and had become a Canadian citizen.
The mother attempted to invoke the Texas court's jurisdiction on the basis
of a contract that the father allegedly entered into in connection with the
adult child's support. The trial court found no contract and, therefore, no
jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding as to juris-
diction, 192 but also discussed the question of whether the Probate Code es-
tablishes a legal duty of support. 193 The appellate court agreed with the
interpretation of the Probate Code by the dissent in Red v. Red 194 and held
further that the trial court had not found that the incompetent lacked an
estate of his own. 195 Finally, the appellate court determined that the statute
applies to parents in the alternative and since the mother had not shown that
she was incapable of providing for her son, she was not entitled to relief. 196
181. Id. at 484. The court relied on TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(b) (Vernon 1986) and
Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. 1977).
182. 743 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied).
183. Id. at 746.
184. "Where an incompetent has no estate of his own, he shall be maintained: ... (b) By
the father or mother of such person, if able to do so; or, if not ... " TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 423 (Vernon 1980).
185. 743 S.W.2d at 746.
186. Id.
187. 552 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. 1977).
188. Id. at 91.
189. 743 S.W.2d at 747.
190. Id.
191. 746 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]), writ denied per curiam, 760
S.W.2d 240 (1988).
192. Id. at 853.
193. See supra note 184.
194. Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d at 98.




The Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, specifically declined to
approve the appellate court's interpretation of the Probate Code or its analy-
sis of Red v. Red. 197
When Burrell, Adkins, and Runnell's are construed together, it appears
that a recognized right may now exist under the Probate Code for a parent
guardian of an incompetent adult child to obtain help from the other parent
in the support of that child. The method for obtaining the relief is rather
clumsy since it requires the use of the Probate Code rather than the Family
Code. Also, since in most cases the parent seeking support help will not, at
the time of the divorce, be the appointed guardian of the incompetent, the
court will have to try two different suits. If the original divorce court could
determine the support needs and the property division at the same time, it
would more efficiently reach a just decision since it has access to all the
evidence and could more easily balance the equities.
V. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
In Kingsley v. Texas 19 8 the court found an attorney guilty of the
"purchase of a child" under the Texas Penal Code. 199 The attorney had
arranged for the adoption of an unwed mother's child. During the mother's
pregnancy, the attorney gave her checks for her rent, groceries, and miscella-
neous items. The court held that these payments did not fall within the code
exception for legal or medical expenses, especially the payments for cosmet-
ics and cigarettes. 2°° The court held that the attorney had no standing to
invoke the overbreadth doctrine, since his conduct fell within the core of
what the statute was intended to prevent.20 1 The court did find that the trial
court had erred in permitting the state to present unadjudicated offenses dur-
ing the punishment phase of the trial and so remanded for a new trial.20 2
A mother who signed an irrevocable relinquishment of her parental rights
and a waiver of notice, changed her mind the following day, and attempted
to intervene in the termination suit by asking the attorney representing the
adoptive parents to notify her of the date of the hearing. The attorney failed
to do so. The court terminated the mother's parental rights, and she ap-
pealed. 203 The appellate court correctly denied relief, since an irrevocable
relinquishment is irrevocable, at least for sixty days.20 4 The court failed to
explain that a waiver of notice waives all notice of the particular hearing. To
bring a writ of error the mother must show that the waiver was involun-
tary.20 5 When the court holds hearings in termination procedures, an indi-
197. 760 S.W.2d 240 (1988) (rejecting the interpretation in Red v. Red).
198. 744 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.).
199. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.06 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
200. 744 S.W.2d at 193.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 196. The remand is actually for a trial only on the punishment. Id. at 196-97;
see TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 44.29 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1989).
203. In re C.T., 749 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
204. Id. at 217.
205. Id.
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gent is entitled to a free statement of facts for use during an appeal. 20 6 When
foster parents might have information about the best interests of the child,
the parents may take the foster parents' depositions. 20 7 After a judgment in
a termination suit becomes final, the psychologist's file created at the request
of the court is not available for disclosure to a party with whom no doctor-
patient relationship exists, unless the psychologist chooses to do so. 20 8
In two cases the mothers' parental rights were terminated because of their
failure to prevent the abuse of their children by their male friends rather
than due to active abuse on the mothers' part. 20 9 In In re KS.210 the court
found clear and convincing evidence 211 that the mother had knowingly
placed the child in dangerous surroundings. 21 2 The court determined that it
was in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights considering
that the mother and child lacked emotional contact. 21 3 In In re L.S. 2 14 the
evidence clearly established that the children had been sexually abused. One
of the children, an eighteen-month-old child, had gonorrhea. The mother
appealed on the basis that her male companion had prejudiced the jury when
he testified by invoking his fifth amendment right to remain silent. The
court overruled this point of error because no one had advance knowledge of
the invocation of the privilege, no motion in limine was presented, and the
witness had answered most of the questions. 215
A third case dealing with termination of a mother's rights differed some-
what from the others. In In re M.H. 2 16 the mother alleged that she needed
clearer findings because the trial court made the findings in the alterna-
tive.2 17 The appellate court found that the trial court had followed the
wording of the statute as to involuntary termination and had specified suffi-
cient facts to inform the mother of the reasons her rights were terminated. 218
The mother also complained that the evidence was not sufficient because she
had not engaged in any direct abuse of her children. The court, relying on
the Texas Supreme Court's definition of "endanger," affirmed the trial
court.
2 19
206. Jones v. Stayman, 747 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. 1987) (court granted writ of
mandamus).
207. Caudillo v. Chiuminatto, 741 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no
writ), granted mandamus to prohibit the preventing of the taking of depositions).
208. Baker v. Alexander, 745 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
209. In re K.S., 752 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ); In re L.S., 748
S.W.2d 571 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
210. 752 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
211. "In a suit in which termination of the parent-child relationship is sought, each finding
required for termination of the parent-child relationship must be based on clear and convinc-
ing evidence." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon 1986).
212. 752 S.W.2d at 234.
213. Id. at 235.
214. 748 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
215. Id. at 576.
216. 745 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
217. Id. at 425.
218. Id. at 426; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989).
219. 745 S.W.2d at 427; see also Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531,
533-34 (Tex. 1987) (distinguishing the words "danger" and "endanger").
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In Subia v. Department of Human Services,2 2 0 the El Paso court of appeals
reversed and remanded because of numerous errors by the trial court.22 1
Although the facts suggested that termination of the parent-child relation-
ship would eventually take place, the court found that the parents' constitu-
tional rights had not been protected, and thus the judgment could not
stand.222 Specifically the court found that the pleadings, which were in the
alternative and merely tracked the statute, did not give fair notice of the
facts.223 The trial court also erred in admitting not only hearsay testimony
of a Department of Human Services caseworker, but also the testimony of a
psychologist when the mother had not been informed that her communica-
tions with the psychologist would not be privileged. 224 Subia underscores
the need for proper procedures in termination of parental rights cases, since
the risk of damage to the children increases with the time taken to resolve
their custody.
The appellate courts reversed three other termination cases because the
evidence adduced at trial was not clear and convincing. 225 In Clay v. Texas
Department of Human Services 226 the court found that the mother posed no
danger to the children. 227 Only the father had abused them. Originally, the
mother had asked for help because the father had beaten her, and she was
afraid for her children's safety. The court held that termination is a harsh
remedy and is not justified where a parent's failure to give the standard of
care required by the Department of Human Services is due solely to lack of
training or misfortune. 228 Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered. 22 9
In Doria v. Texas Department of Human Services230 the court reversed
and remanded because the evidence was not clear and convincing. 231 The
state presented some evidence of abuse, but the mother also presented evi-
dence that she had tried to comply with the Department of Human Service's
plan to regain her children, although she had not fully complied. Addition-
ally, she offered evidence that indicated she loved her children. The evi-
dence was mixed as to her relationship with her boyfriend, who had abused
her in the past, although the court noted that he was no longer permitted to
contact the children. The court did not find sufficient evidence to termi-
nate, 232 but was sufficiently doubtful about the outcome of the case that it
220. 750 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
221. Id. at 831.
222. Id. at 829-30.
223. Id. at 829.
224. Id. at 830-31.
225. Clay v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 748 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, no
writ); Doria v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 747 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1988, no writ); N.S.M. v. Dallas County Welfare Unit, 747 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ). See supra note 211.
226. 748 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, no writ).
227. Id. at 601.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. 747 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
231. Id. at 958-59.
232. Id. at 959.
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reversed and remanded for a new trial.233
N.S.M. v. Dallas County Welfare Unit 234 consisted essentially of a conflict
between parents over custody, with the County Child Welfare Unit having
been called in to act as referee. The father, who had custody, brought
charges of child abuse against his daughter's maternal grandfather. These
charges were substantiated to some extent. The appellate court found that
abuse may have occurred while the child was in the mother's custody, but
the evidence was too equivocal to be sufficient. 235 The evidence as to the
father was even more obscure. Because of his concern for his daughter, he
conducted frequent vaginal examinations to check for penetration. The
court found that the father's concern had become almost an unhealthy ob-
session. 236 Yet at the same time, the father was a loving and concerned
parent, so the court ruled that the trial court should explore less drastic
remedies than termination. 237
233. Id.
234. 747 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
235. Id. at 817.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 817-18.
1989]

